

Image as Remnant: Absent Bodies and Representation.

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Roots of the entangled relationship between death and representation reach far deeper than the act of memorial. In the wake of late 20th Century - of which the work of Elkins, Sontag and Barthes are of particular note - it is sensible to consider the act of representation as the philosophical embodiment of death. Existing under current circumstances, it is appropriate to [re]consider transitions of the being under the premise of the *image as remnant*.

A remnant is created through the removal, usage or destruction of matter. Remains prevail as the residue of division. The bitterness of discontent transcends the entity into a state of disproportionate absence. The remnant is limited to suggest what once was. Residues of the former fall between the invaluable and the priceless; scattering the fine line between the off-cut and the relic. The being is unrecognisable in lifelessness; *someone* becomes *something*. As the embodiment of change, the remnant is the physical trace of a past present. Through this transition the majority is lost - the factual is replaced by a conjecture; when considering the being's transition to the former, the majority that is lost in passing is animate humanity.

A being only exists as their unique self when in a state of constant animation. Human and machine alike, a body encases the mechanisms for life allowing the entity to achieve its' potential when animate; the human requiring a heartbeat, the machine a power source. However, upon de-animation, all that is immaterial is erased. For the human being, immaterial data is the embodiment of our character - how we subconsciously handle our own body - which may only be notable to those externally witnessing our existence. This data can be outlined to be all that is untranslatable: an individual's posture, the tilt of their head and their stride; their reoccurring hand gestures and facial expressions; their accent and their vocabulary, all construct a recognisable yet non-genetic identity - an identity that is *evolved*, not produced; irreproducible. At the moment of de-animation this animate data is lost to flatline objectivity. Despite the remnant body still possessing the mechanism to hold a pen, their handwriting is lost.

Philosophical de-animation occurs through the act of representation where the immaterial identity of the referent being escapes translation; the image may evolve characteristics of self-being and corporeality sustained by the artifice of quasi. Thus, the image exists in suspension, as an inanimate imitation of the living. A tulpa of the deceased. Yet in the presence of a remnant, our own animation is amplified. The body and the image exist as artefacts of the former whose dissented departure haunts as the most sobering reminder of what one has to lose. The body is a remnant object of life; the image is a remnant of a moment - both remain visually loyal to the former despite their inhumanity. The agency of the image as remnant is not to document, but to lay in contrast to the present.